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GLOBALIZATION AND COSMOPOLITANISM: 
TRACING A KANTIAN TRAJECTORY TO 
PEACE 
-Philip Rossi, Sf 
My paper argues that the concepts of 'cosmopolitanism' and 'cosmopolitan right ' 
that Immanuel Kant enunciates in a number of his writings ('Theory and Practice,' 'Toward 
Perpetual Peace,' and The Metaphysics of Morals) provide a particularly useful lens through 
which to examine the dynamics of globalization for their effectiveness in promoting an 
international order capable 'of securing ajust and stable world peace. Kant's own expositions 
of this concept, though all ·brief and schematic, are also remarkably prescient in attending 
to the linkages among commerce, political order and culture that today play important 
roles in the multi-Ie~ phenomenon of globalization. My argument will focus on tile 
element of these co~Pts that is most salient for a moral analysis of globalization: 
Cosmopolitanism as the imaginative horizon for a lTUJral hope that we are able to m~ke the 
processes of globalization function effectively for establishing conditions conductive to a 
just and stable world peace. 
1. Cosmopolitanism: Social Framework for Human Action in History-The 
political, social, and cultural circumstances of Kant's eighteenth-century world were 
considerably different from the ones that fuce humanity at the outset of the twenty-first 
century.' Kant 's Europe was ordered by monarchy and mercantilism, a world in which 
class and gender were taken for granted as appropriate determinants for life prospects. It 
was a Europe already on a journey away from a culture of unquestioned religious faith, 
even as the institutionalized forms of Christianity and popular religiosity both continued 
to have important social , cultural, and political functions. It was a Europe at the height of 
colonial claim upon the Americas, moving to expand its influence in Asia and poised to 
bring Africa under the sway of empire. It was a Europe at the brink of an explosion of 
technological advances that would make the term ' revolution' as apt for the changes effected 
on ordinary life as it was for the changes effected in political institutions in the wake of the 
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War ofIndependence in British North America and the overthrow of the French monarchy. 
Within Kant's own particular context as a citizen-subject of the Prussian monarchy, 
he was considered-and, indeed, considered himself-an advocate of "enlightenment"-i.e., 
of the principles that eventually would enable reason properly to govern the full range of 
human social dynamics in culture and political life. Though during Kant's own lifetime 
there were some who considered him a dangerous radical in view of his continuing sympathy 
for the ideals of the French Revolution, he cast his own articulation of how principles of 
enlightenment apply to concrete human social dynamics in the language of reform rather 
than of revolution. 2 He envisioned it as reform set in motion from above, by the sovereign 
ruler, rather than from below, by the general populace-though the segment of the populace 
that is a " learned public" would play an important role in proViding the conditions that 
enable reform to take proper effect (TP, 8: 298-300/298-99 , 304/302; MdS, 6: 339·3411 
480-81; SF, 7: 89/305; 92-93/307-308)'. When viewed from the perspective of later history-
especially one that takes into account not only the views Kant actually expressed but also 
how those views were then interpreted in subsequent debates about social and political 
order-Kant has been seen as an important figure in the development of liberal political 
thinking. Even though Kant advocated a number of concrete practices that seem at odds 
with political liberalism in many of its influential twentieth-century forms, he has been 
enshrined in the pantheon of liberal thinkers in view of the central role that he gives to 
human freedom, most prominently through his introduction of the concept of the moral 
autonomy of each human person. ' 
Kant's notion of a "cosmopolitan perspective" is one of the concrete ways in which 
he articulates a social authority for reason within his own late 18th century context.' 
Though Kant's discussions of such a cosmopolitan perspective comprise a heterogeneous 
set of texts and touch on a variety of topics, a feature common to many of these teXts is the 
referyncing of a cosmopolitan perspective to an historical trajectory which has as its goal 
the attainment of common human destiny: e. g., in lAG (1784), the "cosmopolitan state" 
is "the perfect civic union of the human species" which is "nature's supreme -objective" 
(8: 28-29/38); the discussion of cosmopolitanism in Cl (1790) occurs in §83, "On the 
Ultimate Purpose that Nature Has as a Teleological System "; similarly, the discussion in 
TP (1793) is embedded in a discussion in which Kant affirms the practical necessity of 
presuming the continuing moral progress of humanity. In AP (1798) the establishment of 
a cosmopolitan society is envisioned in terms of "a regulative principle , [directing us] to 
pursue this diligently as the destiny of the human race'" (7: 331 / 191). Significantly, the 
passages in which Kant does norexplicitly associate what is cosmopolitan with an historical 
trajectory toward human destiny are more narrowly concerned with that aspeci of a 
cosmopolitan perspective that can be articulated as (coercively) enforceable articles of 
international law: rights of hospitality and commerce (MdS, EF). At the end of my 
discussion I will suggest how even this more narrowly construed notion of cosmopolitan 
right has a bearing upon the project of working toward internalional peace that Kant sees 
as a necessary step in the a!lainrnent of the common destiny of humankind . 
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For Kant, then, having a cosmopolitan perspective in its largest sense means taking 
the viewpoint of a "world-citizen" upon the historical and cultural dynamics of human 
social and political interaction as it moves on a trajectory aimed at the destiny of the 
human race. This cosmopolitan perspective functions, moreover. as a framework from 
which an answer-though admittedly not a full answer-can be made to the question 
which Kant identifies as "simultaneously practical and theoretical" (A 805/B 833): "For 
what may I hope?" From a cosmopolitan perspective one may specifically hope for that 
which Kant proposes as a necessary intermediate stage for humanity's reaching its 
appropriate moral destiny. This intermediate stage is the establishment of a federation or 
league of nations which will provide the conditions for perpetual peace and thus for the 
eventual full attainment of the highest good as a social goal for the human species. A 
cosmopolitan perspective is not a viewpoint that someone can just casually take up. It is a 
viewpoint to which one must be educated. A major reason for this is there are elements in 
the dynamics of our hUman moral make-up that stand in tension with the universal, inclusive 
and long-range characteristics that distinguish this outlook as "cosmopOlitan." Chief among 
these tensive elements is what Kant terms our "unsociable sociability" which he describes 
as our "propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which 
constantly threatens to break up the society" (lAG 8: 20115). Book Three of Religion 
within the Bounds of Mere Reason begins with what may very well be Kant's most eloquent 
account of the unsocial sociability under which humanity must work out its moral destiny. 
It is of no little significance that the discussion of an "ethical commonwealth" -Kant's term 
for the highest good as a social goal" -in Division One of this work concludes with two 
explicit references to concerns which inform Kant's account of a cosmopolitan perspective: 
First, in the long foomote to the next to last paragraph, Kant explicitly compares the 
problem facing the achievement of "this end of unity of the pure religion of reason" to the 
problem facing the achievement of a [single] cosmopolitan state (Rei, 6: 123 foomote/ 
152-53); and second, in the final paragraph, Kant affirms the establishment of an ethical 
commonwealth as that which brings with it an assurance of perpetual peace to the world 
(Rei 6: 1241153). 
These passages suggest a number of lines of connection which can be drawn through 
Religion and the essays of the 1790s and 1780s in which Kant tries to articulate a 
cosmopolitan perspective. This should not be too surprising in view of the fact that Kant 
wrote Religion and some of the key essays articulating a cosmopolitan perspective-the 
ones on theory and practice, perpetual peace, and human moral progress-within the 
same four year time-frame (1792-95). The lines of connection most pertinent to Kant's 
efforts here to articulate concrete forms for the highest human social good, moreover, run 
back to the three questions Kant formulates as a precis of the critical project (A 805/B 
833). In conjunction with one another, the ethical commonwealth and a cosmopolitan 
viewpoint each provide elements of a framework that enables moral agents to take their 
individual answers (i. e., the fidelity of the conduct of their moral lives to the self-
governance of reason) to the second question: 
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What ought I do? 
to have an effective bearing on the human destiny that is the outcome of the course 
of history. That destiny provides a common and collective human answer to the third 
question: 
For what may we hope? 
Both these answers can be properly framed, however, only within the context of a 
critically validated answer to the first question: 
What can I know? 
that delimits the proper range of claims that issue from the theoretical and the practical 
uses of reason. All three answers together constirute a prelude to a fourth , anthropological 
question that Kant makes explicit in his lecrures on logiC: 
What is hwnanity?' 
This final question, there is good reason to believe, is the controlling question of 
Kant's entire philosophical career-and, of course, is itself one way of articulating the 
project of resolving the issue of the relationship between nature and freedom. For Kant, 
both the question and its answer lie precisely in the fact that humanity is itself the juncrure 
that unites nature and freedom even while preserving their irreducible difference.' 
Placed in this context, the notion of a cosmopolitan perspective is an articulation of 
what Kant sees as the appropriate human response to the status of our species as the 
unique juncture of narure and freedom. There is, on the one hand, the response that arises 
when we consider the course of human history from the side of the theoretical use of our 
reason. Nature, which has already thrust upon us the necessity of leaving the juridical 
Slate of nature to become citizens of a particular state, now also thrusts upon us-by virtue 
of the circumstances of our human existence as finite, needy beings on a planet of finite 
resources-the necessity of taking the perspective of "world citizen." Since nature gives 
us no choice but to live as social beings, not only within the confines of a single nation, 
but also as members of an assemblage of nations sharing one planet, we must learn to take 
a perspective that looks out from and upon the whole human world. Viewed in terms of 
the exigencies of nature, our human destiny-if there be a common one-can only be 
along whatever path narure carries us. 
The cosmopolitan perspective, however, is not simply the outcome of the workings 
of nature. In fact, the workings of nature can provide us only with the kind of cosmopolitan 
perspective that arises for those who share a vantage point provided by our commOn 
destiny of the graveyard-an image that Kant uses with effective irony at the start of 
"Toward Perpetual Peace." If we wait for the workings of nature to bring about a social 
uruon that will make possible a common hunaan destiny, we will find that destiny only in 
the death that is . our common lot as mortals. Indeed, if we wait for nature to bring about 
the social union that its workings make appropriate for us as the juncture of nature and 
freedom, we may find ourselves cooperating in the attainment of that common fate by 
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inflicting death on one another: Our unsociable sociability remains unregenerate, enabling 
war as the final and inextirpable social form of radical evil. 
In contrast to this, there is the cosmopolitan perspective that can and must be framed 
from the vantage point of reason's practical use. This functions to provide a form of 
comprehensive intelligibility to a matter-the trajectory of the whole course of human 
history-on which reason's theoretical use entangles itself and us in conflicts that are not 
merely dialectical but all too real. Only when formed from the workings of the practical 
use of reason can a cosmopolitan perspective provide us with a critically validated response 
to the question about the outcome of human history. Such a critically valipated response is 
one which poses this question in terms of its moral intelligibility: What ought we do so 
that our being carried in history wherever nature takes us comports properly with the 
unique character of our human status as the juncture of nature and freedom? 
When the question is posed this way, the response then turns on the possibility that 
human beings can and ought mutually to take moral responsibility with one another for 
the outcome of history. A cosmopolitan perspective is thus the critically validated social 
framework from which one may take human action (including one's own) to have effective 
bearing upon the outcome of human history. We 'can effectively act as "world citizens" 
only on the basis of an uncoerced mutual recognition of one another as agents of human 
destiny for one another. This suggests that it is only to the extent that we place our action 
in the framework of a shared hope for a human destiny which we work out in mutual 
recognition of one another's freedom that we will be justified in taking our human destiny 
to move along a trajectory which we impart to it. 
II. Cosmopolitanism and Globalization. "Globalization" is a term that can be 
used to designate a wide range of phenomena affecting human lives and culture in the 
contemporary world and is thus open to a wide range of analyses and construals. As 
shorthand for the processes, practices and technologies that have made it possible for 
human beings to communicate instantaneously with one another at any time and from 
almost any place, globalization of this kind might immediately seem to be a development 
that comports well with Kant's notion of a cosmopolitan perspective and one that would 
make possible a world-wide extension of the public use of reason. We have every reasOlNo 
think that Kant would have welcomed the still growing repertoire of electronic technology 
that enables human beings to transact their business, collaborate in scientific research, 
share advances in knowledge, and expand and deepen their acquaintance with the rich 
array of human life practices and culture. At the same time, we have every reason also to 
think that Kant would have been alert t<i the manner in which any of the activities and 
practices we might group under the term globalization are subject to the human dynamic 
that he terms unsociable sociability and could thus be employed in service of the self-
corruption of the social self-governance of reason. 8 Like any other human dynamic, 
globalization is susceptible to the subtle self-serving inversion of moral maxims that Kant 
terms radical evil. Kant would further insist, I believe, that an appropriate critical 
understanding of the natural and social dynamics at work in globalization must show how 
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the exercise of reason in its practical use puts them in service of humanity's vocation as 
the juncture of namre and freedom, i.e., how both the workings of nature harnessed in 
service of globalization and our human engagement in the direction of that enterprise 
foster the attainment of the social destiny of our humanity. 
Certain dynamics at work in globalization can thus be read in continuity with Kant's 
cosmopolitanism, as a further step on a trajectory in which recognition of mutual economic 
interdependence will playa central role in bringing about a world political order that will 
more effectively reduce the risk of armed conflict among its member states. Placed in the 
grid of meanings and valuations to which Kant's own moral philosophy made a significant 
contribution, the dynamics of globalization can help to effect a deeper recognition of a 
common humanity and to make possible wider acknowledgment of a broad range of rights 
that pertain to each and every person simply in virtue of being human. On this reading 
globalization involves significant opportunities for deepening and widening of the application 
of universal moral principles of justice and fairness, while at the same time giving due 
recognition to the rich array of human cultural differences. 
This cosmopolitan way of reading the dynamics of globalization, however, is not the 
only one. In fact, it is articulated from a grid of meanings and valuations that stands 
radically challenged by other dynamics that, from a different grid of meanings and 
valuations, also seem to be at work in the processes of globalization. From this other grid, 
globalization provides a horizon, more adequate than what the abstract Enlightenment 
universality of cosmopolitanism could offer, for recognizing and highlighting, not the 
commonality and universality connecting human beings to one another, but the particularity 
that makes each human being and set of human circumstances unique. On this reading, 
the import of globalization lies in the new possibilities it can provide for the full articulation 
of human uniqueness and particularity: The establishment of new forms through which 
human beings can make links with one another and have direct access to the output of the 
full range of human knowledge, labor and creativity will make possible a more complete 
expression of the uniqueness of each individual or each group within an ever more closely 
linked web of connections. 
These two readings of globalization are not, of course, the only ones. There are 
other conceptual and imaginative grids that can be applied from the perspectives of 
economics, anthropology, politics, religion, cultural stUdies, communications, ecology-
indeed from almost every of form of human inquiry-precisely because the effects of 
globalization have the potential for affecting every area of hwnan life and affecting it 
"deep down." I have outlined these two particular readings of globalization to bring to the 
fore two quite different possibilities emerging from the process of globalization that have 
an important bearing on construing our human connectedness and our human differences. 
One sees globalization as providing new possibilities for deepening affirmations of human 
connectedness; the other sees it making possible a more radical and complete affirmation 
of human differences. 
These possibilities are not entirely new. Embedded within them are the polarities of 
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our unsociable sociability-and these polarities are, I suspect, not resolvable as simply or 
directly as a construct that tries to directly harmonize them, such as that of "the global 
village," might suggest. Even as globalization makes it possible for human beings to forge 
new and more complex links among themselves, to see more clearly the range of already 
existent connections that tie human activities to one another and to the processes of narure , 
and to allow awareness of the possibilities of interconnection to feed back into the shaping 
of daily practice, it also allows us to construt the most basic form of human connections to 
construct increasingly amenable to determination by the exercise of arbitrary human choice. 
Even as globalization expands the possibilities for acknowledging our likenesses and their 
power to draw us together, it also enables us to construe them in ways that allow us to 
reserve a "right" to withdraw from the claims they place upon us. In each case; globalization, 
as a form of the dynamic of unsociable sociability, provides new possibilities for exhibiting 
the exception made in one's own individual (or group) favor that lies at the heart of radical 
evil ' 
The way that the dynamics of connectedness and difference play out in the processes 
of globalization are themselves affected by the particular economic, CUltural , and historical 
circumstances in which the organizational and technological conditions which make 
globalization possible have emerged. Abstracted from those circumstances, globalization 
alone does not pose any more-or less-of a threat to the social fabric of our human lives 
than predecessor movements (e.g., industrialization) that have had long range impact 
upon human social organization and dynamics. Like those predecessor movements, the 
results are likely to involve both loss and gain-with the particular forms of loss and gain 
emerging from the larger matrix of human activity of which globalization now plays a 
pan. 
Within the context of globalization, I would argue that Kant's notion of a cosmopolitan 
perspective can function as an imaginative "horizon" in which to place these dynamics of 
connectedness and difference. It is a horizon from which we are invited to imagine not 
merely the actual social circumstances in which human beings interact with one another 
but also the social circumstances we can both envision as possible and are willing to I1Ulke 
actual through the exercise of moral freedom. A cosmopolitan perspective thus functions 
to help us construe of some of the concrete human possibilities that can come about only 
in vinue our adopting what Kant calls "hope" as a focus for our moral efforts. Kantian 
hope is constituted by our willingness to il1Ulgine that what we ought to l1Ulke possible for 
one another through the mutual exercise of our freedom is precisely what we can l1Ulke 
possible. This means that hope is more than a mere envisioning -of possibilities. It is an ' 
envisioning of possibilities that enables us to give our action a trajectory that it would not 
have taken in the absence of that hope. 
One measure of the cultural distance that we have traveled in the two centuries that 
separate us from Kant is that a strong case could be made for the proposition that Kant 
himself framed a far more robust and confident answer to the question of our hUman 
destiny-particularly with-respect to humanity as a species-than much of our contemporary 
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culture would allow us to do. Even as the culture of globalization offers a tantalizing 
horizon for the fulfillment of hopes for an individual's immediate life prospects. those 
same dynamics can just as readily induce forgetfulness of the need for-let alone the 
possibiliry of - a common horizon of hope for the humanity connecting us all. The challenge 
is not so much that the implicit answer to the question "For what may we hope?" that 
arises from the contemporary culrural dynamics of immediacy is likely to be "Not much. " 
It is rather that the possibility of raising the question of hope for our common humanity 
does not even occur. In place of the anxiety and despair that has lurked at the edges of a 
declining modernity, a culture of post-moderniry seems far more likely to offer a shrug of 
indifference to concerns about the prospects of humanity. Despair is a possibiliry only 
when hope matters-and there are dynamics at work in the emergent global culture that 
suggest that, indeed, it doesn' t. 
In this context, Kant's remarks at the conclusion of the Rechtslehre are particularly 
instructive: 
.. . What is incumbent on us as a duty is rather to act in conformity with the idea 
of that end [i.e . . perpetual peace as the "highest political good"] even if there is 
nor the slightest theoretical likelihood that it can be realized . as long as its 
impossibiliry cannot be demonstrated either. 
Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its irresistible veto: there is to be no 
war, neither war between you and me in the state of nature nor war between us as states ... for 
war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights. So the question is no longer 
whether perperual peace is something real or a fiction. and whether we are not deceiving 
ourselves in our theoretical judgments when we assume that it is real. Instead, we must 
act as if it is something real. though perhaps it is not; we must work toward establishing 
perpetual peace and the kind of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a 
republicanism of all states, together and separately) in order to bring about perperual 
peace ... And even if the complete realization of this objective always remains a pious 
wish, still we are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of working 
incessantly toward it (MdS, 6: 354-55/491). 
As Kant is quite clearly aware. the theoretical "non-impossibility" that the workings 
of nature could bring about the conditions for perperual peace among nations seems hardly 
sufficient to constitute grounds for bringing us to work for it. Indeed. the perperual peace 
that nature brings is just as likely to be that of the graveyard as that of an international 
political order. All that such theoretical non-impossibility supplies is space in which the 
full significance of the exercise of our human freedom toward the goal of perpetual peace 
becomes evident. Perperual peace will not come in the absence of human willingness to 
hope for it precisely in a way that conSlrues it as goal thaI we are able to effect. It will not 
come about until and unless we are willing to envision that it will come about precisely in 
virtue of the exercise of our freedom. In the absence of such hope, perperual peace becomes 
in fact impossible-not because it is of itself impossible but because we have denied thaI 
its possibility is something we can effect through our hwrum freedom . 
, 
" 1: 
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This Kantian focus on hope with respect to the possibility of perpetual peace indicates 
something quite ironic about the denial of the social authority of reason that has arisen 
from our own contemporary cultural context known as the .. post-modern .... This denial is 
not about what the exercise of our reason authorizes us to think about our social relationships, 
but it is more a denial of what the exercise of our reason authorizes us to imagine and to 
will about those relationships. The denial that reason has social authority is equivalently a 
claim that we can neither imagine nor will the circumstances under which human beings 
could freely and mutually establish a fully inclusive, universal, non-coercive set of social 
relationships for the mutual exercise of their freedom. From Kant's perspective, reason 
authorizes us to ask: What is the basis for such a denial? What requires us to take such 
relationships as lying beyond our power to effect? Are we inl!Vitably bound by past human 
failures to establish and successfully foster such relationships? If we rule them out as 
beyond our powers , of course we will be unwilling to bring them about; but if we enlarge 
our imagination to encompass them as relationships that we have the power to effect, then 
we indeed make it possible for us to work toward making them actual. As in the case of 
perpetual peace, [he fundamental denial is of the possibility of hope-peace is not in itself 
impossible; we mLlke it impossible by denying that we can effect it through the exercise of 
our human freedom. 
Kant's proposal for perpetual peace may be of use to us not so much for the details 
it provides for an international federation of nations but for the way in which it portrays 
perpetual peace as an object of hope that is necessary for providing a cenain trajectory to 
the determination of actions that we undertake in concert with one another. As long as we 
keep it in view as an object of our hope, perpetual peace among nations becomes possible. 
It is seen as possible precisely as an outcome ofhumLln actions taken, in view of this hope, 
to establish an international political order. In the absence of such hope, actions to establish 
an international order to make perpetual peace possible will not be taken , with the result 
thaI the only perpetual peace that can be brought into being is that of the graveyard. 
The hope that reason requires us to have for perpetual peace is, of course, one that 
Kane places in the context of the larger set of circumstances in which we find ourselves as 
and at the juncture of nature and freedom. The workings of nature have a role to play in 
the attainment of the human destiny that we must work out in view of our unique status in 
the cosmos. Kant thus indicates in a variety of places that the attainment of our human 
destiny, as the juncture of nature and freedom-including importane stages on the way, 
such as perpetual peace-is an outcome of causal processes by which nature (or, as he will 
sometimes call it , "providence") does often make us do unwittingly and unwillingly what 
we willingly ought to do-but in fuct do no!. Nature need not wait for the exercise of 
human freedom to effect conditions conducive to the attainment of human destiny. Nature 
even utilizes our "unsociable sociability" to spur us to the development of the culture and 
the civil order that provide external conditions conducive to attainment of our human 
moral destiny (e. g., lAG, 8: 24-26/34-6; el, 5: §83, 429-434/297-301; TP , 8: 310-131 
307-309; AP, 7: 322-25/183-86; 328-31/188-91). 
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Yet even as he affirms the role of nature, Kant is equally insistent that the attainment 
of human moral destiny is something the use of our reason demands of us. Bringing that 
destiny about-including perpetual peace as a stage on the way-finally rests upon what 
human beings concretely do (e. g., TP, 8: 312-13/308-9; EF, 8: 355-57/327-28,368/336-
37; MdS, 6: 354-55/490-92). Natur;.can spur us unwittingly and unwillingly only so far 
along the path to perpetual peace and our moral destiny: The moral demand which reason 
places on the formation of our action requires that we not take the attainment of perpetual 
peace or of the moral destiny of the human species as a foregone conclusion of the dynamics 
of nature. It is rather a task whose final shape and completion depend upon the propedy-
ordered actions of human beings-and the ordering of such actions is a function of the 
hope that such human action will be effective in the attainment of these objects of hope. 
As a result, the particular human social, cultural and political dynamics over which hUman 
beings can exercise control in accord with the self-governance of reason will have a decisive 
impact upon the trajectory along which humanity moves toward the attainment of a goal 
such as perpetual peace. 
It may be easy to overlook the fact that Kant places the project of perpetual peace 
within the context of the hope that arises from the practical use of reason because he 
places principal responsibility for acting in accord with such hope not on all citizens but 
on the sovereign monarchs of the Europe of his day. 10 Within Kant 's own historical context, 
"Towards Perperual Peace" is an ironic, perhaps even a sardonic, plea for enlightened 
political leadership in the matter of international relations based precisely on the hope that 
the exercise of leadership by kings and princes has power to make a new order among 
nations possible. Although monarchs no longer wield political sovereignty in our world, 
Kant's essay retains its sharp moral bite, since there apparently continues to be little 
effective will for peace among the politically powerful. In our context, however, the moral 
bite of his proposal is not only for the leader~of nations. We are in a position to recognize 
more clearly than Kant did tlult the moral exercise of our reason places the demand to 
strive for peace upon members of every polity, but especially upon citizens of nations with 
a republican (representative) form of government (EF, 8: 349-511322-24, 355-56/327-28; 
cf. TP , 8: 310-121307-9). Political leaders will be far more likely to show an effective will 
for peace and then act upon it only when it is first voiced as the will of those on whose 
behalf they exercise their leadership ." 
The point that Kant makes in his eloquent plea for us to work for perpetual peace is 
thus quite simple. [fanything makes peace "impossible" across our human divisions, it is 
not the inexorable causal workings of a nature outside human direction; it is not a set of 
circumstances that lie beyond the power of human beings to alter. International peace as 
well as the conditions that can bring it about are not impossible to imagine; it seems rather 
that because they are difficult to achieve, because their achievement will likely require all 
parties to alter often deeply entrenched particular interests to construct a common interest, 
it is easier to declare them unthinkable or impossible rather than to exercise the imagination 
and will to make them actual. They are difficult to achieve because they require both 
• 
172 In Quest of Peace 
individual and common commitment to overcome what are the real sources that block 
them: Narrowness of imagination and recalcitrance of will. They are difficult to achieve 
because they require a form of moral courage that is empowered only by a willingness to 
act upon the possibilities opened up by a horizon of a cosmopolitan perspective. In Kant's 
terms, the "impossibility" is one that resides precisely in our capacity to say "no" to that 
dynamic of the moral exercise of our reason that orders us to mutual moral recognition of 
one another. It is a form of radical evil, with the consequence that such "impossibility" is 
one for which we can be held accountable-or, to frame this in terms proper to the social 
authority of reason, it is an "impossibility" for which we must finally hold one another 
accountable. 12 
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